

**IN THE CLAIMS:**

Claims 1 - 13 are pending in this application. Please amend claims 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 11 and 13 as follows:

1. (Currently Amended) A tamper-resistant modular multiplication method for decreasing the relationship between data processing and consumption current therefor in an information-processing device which includes an input/output port communicating with an external device, a memory device for storing both programs and data, a central processing unit executing the data processing in accordance with said programs, and a bus connecting among the input/output port, the memory device and the central processing unit, when calculating a modular multiplication,  $A*B*R^{(-1)} \bmod N$ , which appears during performing crypto-processing as the data processing, utilizing an information-processing device said method comprising the steps of:

(1) selecting either of the following steps (2) and (3) at random;

(2[[1]]) calculating  $S_1 = A*B*R^{(-1)} \bmod N$  where B is a multiplier, A is a multiplicand, N is a product of large primes, and R is  $2^t$  (a bit length of a bit string of data) according to the Montgomery's method of calculating a modular multiplication for the data;

(3[[2]]) in place of the step (1), calculating  $S_2 = \{sN + A^{(-1)^f}\} * \{tN + B^{(-1)^g}\} R^{(-1)} \bmod N$ , (among arbitrary integers s, t, f, g, at least one is an integer excepting 0, and f, g are both 0 or 1);

(3) properly selecting the step (1) or (2);

(4) properly repeating the above-mentioned steps (1), (2), (3) for each bit block consisting of the data, wherein finally when the step (2[[1]]) is selected for a last bit block of the data, for a calculation result  $S_1$ ,  $T_1 = S_1 * R^{(-1)} \bmod N$  is calculated to output  $T_1$ , and when the step (3[[2]]) is selected, for a calculation result  $S_2$ ,  $T_2 = S_2 * R^{(-1)} \bmod N$  is calculated to output  $N - T_2$ ; and

(5) using  $T_1$  and  $N - T_2$  as a calculation result of a modular multiplication,  $A*B*R^{(-1)} \bmod N$ .

2. (Currently Amended) A tamper-resistant modular multiplication method of claim 1, wherein said ~~properly~~ selecting in the step (1[[3]]) means to select either one using random numbers.
3. A tamper-resistant modular multiplication method of claim 1, wherein said (s, t, f, g) are (0, 1, 0, 1).
4. A tamper-resistant modular multiplication method of claim 1, wherein said (s, t, f, g) are (1, 0, 1, 0).
5. (Currently Amended) A tamper-resistant modular multiplication method for decreasing the relationship between data processing and consumption current therefor in an information processing device which includes an input/output port communicating with an external device, a memory device for storing both programs and data, a central processing unit executing the data, processing in accordance with said programs, and a bus connecting among the input/output port, the memory device and the central processing unit, when calculating a modular multiplication, A\*B mod p (p is a prime), which appears during performing crypto-processing as the data processing utilizing an information processing device, said method comprising the steps of:
  - (1) selecting either of the following steps (2) and (3) at random;
  - (2[[1]]) calculating S = A\*B mod p where B is a multiplier, A is a multiplicand) for a bit string of data;
  - (3[[2]]) ~~in place of the step (1)~~, calculating  $S = \{Sp + A*(-l)^F\} * \{Tp + B*(-1)^G\} \text{ mod } p$  (among arbitrary integers s, t, f, g, at least one is an integer excepting 0, f and g are both 0 or 1, and f + g is an even number); and
  - (3) properly selecting the step (1) or (2);
  - (4) using the calculation result S which is selected from said step (2[[1]]) or (3[[2]]) as a calculation result of a modular multiplication, A\*B mod p.
6. A tamper-resistant modular multiplication method of claim 5, wherein said (s, t, f, g) are (1, 1, 1, 1).

7. (Currently Amended) A tamper-resistant modular multiplication method of claim 5, wherein the value of  $f + g$  in said step (3[[2]]) is an odd number, and wherein said method further comprising in place of said step (4):
- (4) a step wherein when said step (2[[1]]) is selected the calculation result  $S$  is adopted as it is, and when said step (3[[2]]) is selected,  $p - S$  is adopted as a calculation result in place of  $S$ ; and
- (5) a step for adopting said  $S$  and  $p - S$  as a calculation result of a modular multiplication operation,  $A * B \bmod p$ , for crypto-processing.
8. A tamper-resistant modular multiplication method of claim 7, wherein said  $(s, t, f, g)$  are  $(0, 1, 0, 1)$ .
9. (Currently Amended) A tamper-resistant modular multiplication method for decreasing the relationship between data processing and consumption current therefor in an information processing device which includes an input/output port communicating with an external device, a memory device for storing-both programs and data, a central processing unit executing the data processing in accordance with said programs, and a bus connecting among the input/output port, the memory device and the central processing unit, when calculating a modular multiplication,  $A(x)*B(x) \bmod \Phi(x)$ , which appears during performing crypto-processing as the data processing, utilizing an information processing device, wherein  $\Phi(x)$  is an irreducible polynomial of a variable  $x$  and the operation of coefficients of  $A(x)*B(x)$  is performed for modulus of a prime  $p$  which is 3 or more), said method comprising the steps of:
- (1) selecting either of the following steps (2) and (3) at random
- (2[[1]]) calculating  $S(x) = A(x)*B(x) \bmod \Phi(x)$ , where  $A(x)$  or  $B(x)$  is a polynomial of  $x$ ;
- (3[[2]]) ~~in place of the step (1), calculating  $S(x) = \{s\Phi(x) + A(x)*(-1)^f\} * \{t\Phi(x) + B(x)*(-1)^g\} \bmod \Phi(x)$  (among arbitrary integers  $s, t, f, g$ , at least one is an integer excepting 0,  $f$  and  $g$  are both 0 or 1, and  $f + g$  is an even number); and~~
- (3) properly selecting the step (1) or (2);
- (4) using the calculation result  $S(x)$  which is selected from said step (2[[1]]) and (3[[2]])) as a calculation result of a modular multiplication,  $A(x)*B(x) \bmod \Phi(x)$ , for cryptoprocessing.

10. A tamper-resistant modular multiplication method of claim 9, wherein said (s, t, f, g) are (1, 1, 1, 1).
11. (Currently Amended) A tamper-resistant modular multiplication method of claim 9, wherein the value of f + g in the step (3[2]) is an odd number, and wherein said method further comprises in place of said step (4):
  - (4) a step wherein when the step (2[1]) is selected the calculation result S(x) is adopted as it is, and when said step (3[2]) is selected,  $\Phi(x) - S(x)$  is adopted as a result of calculation result in place of S(x); and
  - (5) a step for adopting said S(x) and  $\Phi(x) - S(x)$  as a calculation result of a modular multiplication operation,  $A(x)*B(x) \bmod \Phi(x)$ , for crypto-processing.
12. A tamper-resistant modulus multiplication method of claim 11, wherein said (s, t, f, g) are (0, 1, 0, 1).
13. (Currently Amended) A tamper-resistant modular multiplication method of claim 9, wherein said [the] operation of the coefficients of  $A(x)*B(x)$  is performed for modulus of a prime 2 and (f, g) in said step (3[2]) are (0, 0).